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FOUR LAWS* IN THIRTEEN MONTHS:
PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST IN
OKLAHOMA VEHICLES
I. INTRODUCTION
The procedure for perfecting a security interest' in an Oklahoma
vehicle has recently been modernized. Until July 1, 1979, perfection of
a security interest in a vehicle2 was primarily governed by Article 9 of
Oklahoma's Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 3 The U.C.C. perfec-
* On July 5, 1979, the Oklahoma legislature approved another amendment to the perfection
statute discussed in this comment. Act of July 5, 1979, ch. 292, 1979 Okla. Sess. Laws 886, 895
(hereinafter referred to as 1979 Law II). This latest amendment presumably took effect July 5,
1979, as the word "emergency" followed the approval date. See text accompanying note 80 infra.
The 1979 Law was in effect only from July 1 to July 4, 1979, at which time the 1979 Law II
amendments took effect. As a result, there have been five laws within thirteen months governing
the perfection of security interests in Oklahoma vehicles.
Although the 1979 Law II does not alter the time and method of perfection under the earlier
law, it does make several notable changes. The term "vehicle" has been redefined to include only
vehicles for which there are certificates of title and to exclude certain specialized vehicles such as
those used in highway construction. 1979 Law II, § 23.2b(A)(1). Subsections (D) and (E) of the
1979 Law are consolidated by the 1979 Law I1 in its subsection (D). Under this new subsection
(D), a secured party whose interest was perfected before the effective date of the 1979 Law may
continue his perfection as before, or may perfect under the new certificate perfection of the 1979
Law. 1979 Law II, § 23.2b(D). The new subsection (D) also provides that the debtor or other
holder of the certificate has a duty to assist the secured party in perfecting. Id. This last provision
should alleviate some of the burdens placed on the secured party by the 1979 Law. See note 96
infra.
I. A perfected security interest is one which has the maximum protection available against
third parties who claim interests in the vehicle. Casterline v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 195
Pa. Super. Ct. 344,-, 171 A.2d 813, 818 (1961). The Uniform Commercial Code does not define
the term perfection.
2. The term vehicle is defined in title 47, section 23.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes as "[e]very
device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn, except
devices moved by human or animal power, when not used upon stationary rails or tracks." OKLA.
STAT. tit. 47, § 23.1 (1971). Vehicles include house trailers, mobile homes, motor vehicles, semi-
trailers, pole trailers, trailers, and travel trailers. Motor vehicles include ambulance service vehi-
cles, automobiles, minibikes, motor busses, motorcycles, recreational vehicles, taxicabs, trucks,
and truck-tractors. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 22.1 (Supp. 1978). The new certificate law governs the
perfection of security interests created in any of the above vehicles or motor vehicles, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-302(3) & (4) (Supp. 1978); Act of May 17, 1979, ch. 181, § 6, 1979 Okla. Sess,
Laws 460 (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 23.2b) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Law].
3. All citations to Uniform Commercial Code sections refer to OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ I-
101 to 10-104 (1971 & Supp. 1978). All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code comments and
the Oklahoma Code comments refer to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (West
1963). Oklahoma enacted the 1962 version of the U.C.C., with some variations, to be effective at
midnight December 31, 1962. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 10-101 (1971).
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tion provisions required the filing of a financing statement with the
county clerk in the county of the debtor's residence.' This method of
perfection, however, is followed by only a distinct minority of jurisdic-
tions. Most states have revitalized their perfection procedures to better
meet the needs of modem commercial transactions.' Perfection in
these states is not governed by the U.C.C. provisions but rather by state
certificate laws.6 To perfect a security interest in a vehicle, these states
typically require notation of the security interest on the vehicle's certifi-
cate of title.7 Alternatively, they may require a combination of nota-
tion and delivery of specific forms to a designated state official. 8
A 1977 amendment9 to both the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Title
4. U.C.C. § 9-401(1)(a). Although there are no reported Oklahoma decisions on this proce-
dure, see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Long-Lewis Hardware Co. 54 Ala. App. 188, -,
306 So. 2d 277, 279 (Civ. App. 1974). For a detailed discussion of the pertinent Oklahoma statutes
dealing with perfection prior to the 1979 change, see notes 29-34 infra and accompanying text. It
should be noted that this comment is limited to the case where the vehicle is a consumer good as
defined in U.C.C. § 9-109(1) and the debtor is a resident of Oklahoma.
5. See In re McGovern, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 234, 237 (D. Conn. 1969). See generally 1 G.
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 20.1-.8 (1965).
6. A certificate of title is "any document issued under state authority, on which notation of
security interests is either required. . . or permitted .. " I G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 20.8, at
576. Hereinafter certificate of title will be referred to as certificate.
7. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b) specifically refers secured parties to state certificate of title laws.
For the text of this section see note 92 infra. As of 1970, eighteen states had certificate laws which
required delivery of specified forms to an official and actual notation of the security interest on the
certificate as the exclusive method of perfection. Ward, Interstate Perfection of the Motor Vehicle
Security Interest: .4 Bottleneck in Section 9-103, 34 ALB. L. REv. 251, 258 (1970). Also as of 1970,
an additional seventeen states had adopted certificate laws which merely provided for notation of
the security interest on the certificate. According to Professor Ward, this latter group of states
makes delivery of the required documents to the proper official the sole prerequisite for perfection.
Id. at 259. The 1979 amendment to Oklahoma's certificate law adopts the latter approach. See
notes 88-111 infra and accompanying text. Professor Gilmore suggests that the trend is to abolish
filing in favor of notation as the method of perfecting a security interest in a vehicle. See 1 G.
GILMORE, supra note 5, § 20.1, at 553.
Prior to July 1, 1979, Oklahoma's certificate statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 23 (1971), was
classified as a "non-exclusive" statute. A "non-exclusive" statute requires the notation of some
but not all interests or liens on the certificate itself. I G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 20.1, at 553;
Ward, supra, at 257; Welsh, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles Under Section 9-302 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 265, 269 (1968). Generally only those interests or liens
which are created or are in existence upon a transfer of ownership of the vehicle by the purchaser
are noted. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 23.6 (1971). This notation, however, is not connected with the
perfection process. Welsh, supra, at 269. See note 40 infra for a discussion of OKLA. STAT. tit. 47,
§ 23.6 (1971).
8. Ward, supra note 7, at 258.
9. Act of June 14, 1977, ch. 223, 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws 556 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
12A, § 9-302 & tit. 47, § 23.3 (Supp. 1978)) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Law]. The 1977 and 1978
amendments, see note 15 infra, to section 23.3 are printed consecutively in the Official Oklahoma
1978 Statutory Supplement. The first printed amendment will be referred to in the text as the 1977
Law; the second amendment will be referred to as the 1978 Law. Citations for the 1977 and 1978
Laws will be from the Official 1978 Oklahoma Statutory Supplement. Citations for the 1979 Law
will be from the 1979 Oklahoma Session Laws.
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Act' 0 and the U.C.C. radically altered the manner of perfecting a vehi-
cle security interest. Although some question exists as to its effective
date and duration," this law made the issuance of a certificate, on
which the security interest was noted, the method of perfection.' 2
Under this procedure Oklahoma was an "exclusive" certificate of title
state' 3 because perfection of a security interest in a vehicle was no
longer governed by the filing provisions of the U.C.C.' 4
A 1978 amendment 5 to the Motor Vehicle Title Act and to the
U.C.C. again altered the perfection procedure. Only two sections of
this law ever took effect. 6 The perfection provisions of the 1978 Law
never became operative due to another amendment which was passed
in 1979.17 The 1979 act became effective July 1, 1979, and repealed the
perfection procedures under both the 1977 and 1978 Laws.' 8
The 1979 act has simplified the perfection procedure by changing
both the time and method of perfection as provided by the U.C.C. and
the 1977 Law. On its face, the 1979 act makes the delivery of certain
forms to the Oklahoma Tax Commission or to one of its motor license
agents the sole prerequisite to perfection.' 9 Yet when read in conjunc-
tion with the pertinent U.C.C. provisions, it is unclear whether notation
of the security interest on the certificate is also part of the perfection
procedure of the 1979 Law.20 If delivery is viewed as the sole require-
ment for perfection, the statute is consistent with the Code's "race of
diligence" approach at the expense of the notice function of perfec-
tion.2 Conversely, if notation of the security interest on the certificate
10. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 23-23.13 (1971 & Supp. 1978).
11. See notes 48-87 infra and accompanying text.
12. 1977 Law, supra note 9, § 23.3(B), at 1040.
13. Under an "exclusive" certificate law, all security interests must be noted on the certificate.
Compliance with the certificate act is the exclusive method of perfection. Filing under the U.C.C.
is not required and is ineffective to perfect a security interest if made. I G. GILMORE, supra note
5, § 20.1, at 553; Ward, supra note 7, at 257; Welsh, supra note 7, at 269.
14. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b) & (4).
15. Act of April 4, 1978, ch. 135, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws 243 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A,
§ 9-302 & tit. 47, § 23.3 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Law].
16. See notes 18 & 48-84 infra and accompanying text.
17. 1979 Law, supra note 2.
18. Id. § 8. It is important to note that the 1979 Law did not repeal the 1978 Law's amend-
ment to U.C.C. § 9-302. As amended by the 1978 Law, § 9-302 became effective July 1, 1979.
1978 Law, supra note 15, § 9-302, at 422. See note 92 infra for the text of this section.
19. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(A)(1). Hereinafter "Oklahoma Tax Commission" will be
referred to as the "Commission," and a "motor license agent" will be referred to as an "agent."
20. U.C.C. § 9-302(4). See notes 98-103 infra and accompanying text.
21. In U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) - (b), the drafters adopted the common law doctrine known as the
"race of diligence" approach. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-312, U.C.C. comment 4 (West
1963). Under this approach, if conflicting secured parties perfect by filing, the first to file gains
[Vol. 14:770
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is a prerequisite to perfection, the statute fulfills the notice function of
the Code at the expense of a diligent secured party who fails to procure
notation due to the Commission's error.22 The purpose of this com-
ment is to delineate the changes made by the 1979 Law and to provide
an interpretation of the 1979 act which balances the diligence and no-
tice policies of the Code. In addition, it will highlight the problems
which may result from having four changes in Oklahoma's vehicle
perfection law within thirteen months.23
ii. OKLAHOMA'S PERFECTION PROCEDURE
A secured party perfects a security interest in a vehicle to gain pri-
ority over prior unperfected secured parties, subsequent secured par-
ties, and subsequent lien creditors, all of whom may claim interests in
the same vehicle.2' Although the unperfected secured party is able to
enforce a valid security agreement 2 against the debtor as well as
priority without regard to his or her knowledge of prior unperfected security interests in the collat-
eral. If, however, one or more conflicting secured parties do not perfect by filing, then priority is
determined by order of perfection. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 25-4, at 906 (1972).
22. See notes 101-04 infra and accompanying text.
23. This comment will be concerned primarily with the perfection procedure to be followed
by either the seller or the financing agent who has taken a purchase money security interest in a
motor vehicle. U.C.C. § 9-107. There will be only limited reference to security interests taken in
inventory held by a dealer for sale or lease. See note 88 infra. For commentary on the perfection
procedures in multistate transactions, see generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, §§ 22.1-.9; J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 23-21, at 855; Meyers, Multi-State Motor Vehicle Transac-
tions Under the UCC.: An Update, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 834 (1977); Ward, supra note 7; Comment,
Interstate Movement a/Motor Vehicles Subject to Security Interests: A Case for Repealing UCC
§ 9.103(4), 54 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1969); Comment, Interstate Movement ofMotor Vehicles:
Certfcate of Title Acts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 CREIGHTON L. REv. 373 (1975);
Comment, Resolving Conflicts.4risingfrom the Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: The Origi-
nal UCC§ 9-103 andthe Successors, 35 OHIO L.J. 990 (1974); Comment, Certficates of Title and9-
103: Some Problems Solved, Others Left Unresolved, 46 TEMP. L.J. 90 (1972).
The following Code terms and definitions will be used throughout the comment: "Debtor"
means the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured. U.C.C. § 9-
105(l)(d).
"Secured party" means a lender, seller, or other person in whose favor there is a security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(i).
"Security agreement" means an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h).
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
"Collateral" means the property subject to a security interest. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c).
24. Casterline v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 344,_, 171 A.2d 813,
816 (1961); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 23-5.
25. To create an enforceable security agreement, the parties must complete four steps. Peter-
son v. Ziegler, 39 Ill. App. 3d 379, -, 350 N.E.2d 356, 360 (1976). First, they must enter an
agreement which creates or provides for a security interest. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h). Second, they
must reduce the agreement to a writing which describes the collateral, includes language creating
4
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against general creditors and some subsequent purchasers of the vehi-
cle,26 the unperfected secured party is in a subordinate positon to most
lien creditors and to perfected secured parties who hold interests in the
vehicle.27
A. The Law Before Juy 1, 1979
Except for the period between July 1 and July 28, 1978,28 the pro-
cedure for perfecting a security interest in a vehicle was governed whol-
ly by the U.C.C. until July 1, 1979. The secured party perfected a
security interest by filing29 a financing statement 0 with the county clerk
a security interest in that collateral, and is signed by the debtor. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(b); Mitchell v.
Shepherd Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1972). The agreement need not be signed
by the secured party to be enforceable against the debtor. Moreover, a writing is not required if
the secured party has possession of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203(I)(a). Third, the debtor must
have acquired rights in the collateral. Fourth, the secured party must have given value in return
for the security interest. There is no requirement that the four steps occur simultaneously. Unless
an explicit agreement between the parties postpones the time of attachment, it is only upon the
completion of all the steps that the security interest comes into being and attaches. Morton Booth
Co. v. Tiara Furniture, Inc., 564 P.2d 210, 213 (Okla. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-204,
Oklahoma Code comment (West 1963). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 21,
§§ 23-I to 23-4. The significance of attachment is evident from the two requirements of U.C.C.
§ 9-303(1): "a security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the applicable
steps required for perfection have been taken." U.C.C. § 9-303(l).
26. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301, 9-307. If the subsequent purchaser is a buyer in the ordinary
course, he or she will take the vehicle free of a security interest created by the debtor-seller even
though the interest is perfected and even though the purchaser knows of the interest. U.C.C. § 9-
307. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Kunkel's, Inc., 581 P.2d 878, 881 (Okla. 1978). A buyer in the ordinary
course is a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale violates the security
interest of the secured party buys in the ordinary course from a person in the busines of selling
goods of that kind. U.C.C. § 1-201(9). If the subsequent purchaser is not a buyer in the ordinary
course, he or she will take the vehicle free of the security interest to the extent of the value given,
so long as the vehicle is received without knowledge of the security interest and before it is per-
fected. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(c).
27. Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara Furniture, Inc., 564 P.2d 210, 213 (Okla. 1977); U.C.C. § 9-
301(l)(a)-(b). Under § 9-301(l)(b), a person must become a lien creditor without knowledge of
the security interest and before it is perfected to take priority over an unperfected secured party.
In re McClain, 447 F.2d 241, 244 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
28. See notes 44-87 infra and accompanying text.
29. With some exceptions, U.C.C. § 9-302(l) requires filing as the condition precedent to
perfection. Section 9-302(3) provides for perfection by notation of the security interest on the
certificate in place of filing where a state statute so requires. U.C.C. § 9-403(1) provides that filing
is complete upon presentation for filing of the financing statement and tender of the filing fee.
Filing a financing statement is the most common method of perfection. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 21, § 23-5. It serves as a notice which alerts third parties to the secured party's claim
and tells them where to look for more information. Id. See Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State
Bank, 458 F.2d 700, 704 (10th Cir. 1972); In re Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
In fact, subsequent purchasers and creditors are charged with notice of a properly perfected secur-
ity interest. National Trailer Convoy Co. v. Mount Vernon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 420 P,2d 889,
893 (Okla. 1966).
30. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
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in the county of the debtor's residence. 3 1 The formal requirements of a
financing statement included the signatures of the debtor and the se-
cured party, an address of the secured party from whom information
concerning the security interest could be obtained, a mailing address of
the debtor, and a description of the collateral.32 Although the financing
statement could be filed before the security interest attached, 33 perfec-
tion occurred only when attachment and filing were both completed.34
The U.C.C. filing procedure gave inefficient notice to subsequent
parties of a security interest in a vehicle even when a financing state-
ment was properly filed. Under this procedure, subsequent parties had
the burden of checking with the county clerk's office for prior security
interests in the vehicle. In contrast, under a typical certificate law, sub-
sequent parties only need to glance at the certificate to discover prior
security interests.35 Moreover, the notice function of perfection was
frustrated if the financing statement was misfiled or if the financing
statement was not filed or indexed under the debtor's legal name.36 Fi-
31. U.C.C. § 9-401(I)(a). This provision describes the proper filing place to perfect a security
interest in consumer goods. A vehicle which is "purchased and used primarily for personal pur-
poses is a [consumer good]." U.C.C. § 9-109(1). In re Armstrong, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 781, 783
(W.D. Okla. 1970). The debtor's residence has been interpreted to mean "permanent residence."
Id. If the debtor's residence changes, U.C.C. § 9-401(3) provides that a proper filing is effective
for four months after the debtor changes residence to another county. The filing is ineffective
thereafter unless a copy of the financing statement is signed by the secured party and filed in the
new county within the four-month period. Id. A secured party who is in doubt about the proper
classification of the collateral should file in all counties where filing may be required. In re
McClain, 477 F.2d 241, 244-45 (10th Cir. 1971).
32. U.C.C. § 9-402(l). The information to be provided in a financing statement is compara-
ble to the information to be provided in the application for a certificate of title. See note 40 infira.
Consistent with the notice function of filing, U.C.C. § 9-402(5) provides that the financing state-
ment is effective even though it contains minor errors. Central Nafl Bank & Trust Co. v. Com-
munity Bank & Trust Co., 528 P.2d 710, 712 (Okla. 1974). Moreover, U.C.C. § 9-402(l) permits a
copy of the security agreement to be filed instead of a financing statement if it meets the require-
ments of that section. Although a copy of the security agreement could constitute a financing
statement, the converse is not necessarily true. The financing statement usually does not include
words which create a security interest-a prerequisite for an enforceable security agreement.
Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700, 704 (10th Cir. 1972). See note 25 supra. See
generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, §§ 23-3 & 23-16. For commentary concerning
the formal requirements of a financing statement, see generally Comment, Commercial Transac-
tions: The Adequacy of the Descriotion of Collateral in UCC Financing Statements and Security
Agreements, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 469 (1974); Comment, Secured Transactions: Failure of Secured
Party to Sign Financing Statement, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 101 (1968); Comment, Descriotion of Collat-
eral in Financing Statement: Should It Be Required?, 4 VAL. U.L. REv. 205 (1969).
33. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
34. U.C.C. § 9-303(1). For a discussion of what constitutes attachment, see note 25 supra.
35. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
36. An error by the filing officer did not prevent a secured party from achieving perfection
unless his or her conduct caused the filing officer's mistake. In re Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799, 803
(W.D. Okla. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-403, Oklahoma Code comment 1 (West 1963);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-407, U.C.C. comment 1 (West 1963).
6
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nally, the filing system allowed a devious debtor to secure more credit
than the vehicle deserved as collateral.
Illustrative of this last problem is Central National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Community Bank & Trust Co. 7 In that case, Central National,
and Community Bank made loans to the same debtor, James Lee An-
derson. Community Bank made the first loan and took a security inter-
est in the debtor's new car. A proper filing was made in the county
clerk's office under "Lee Anderson." Community Bank did not, how-
ever, examine the manufacturer's certificate of origin 38 to confirm that
the certificate of title would be issued to Lee Anderson. The debtor
applied for and received a certificate of title in the name of James Lee
Anderson.39 Six months later, Central National made a loan to the
debtor as "James L. Anderson," and took a security interest in the same
car. Central National properly filed its security agreement with the
county clerk after determining that no prior financing statements or
security agreements had been filed on the car against James Lee Ander-
son, the name shown on the certificate of title. Consistent with the
U.C.C. filing procedure, neither security interest was noted on the cer-
tificate of title.4" The debtor subsequently obtained three additional
loans from two other banks and gave security interests in the same car.
When the debtor defaulted on the payment of the second loan, Central
National sought foreclosure of its security interest in the vehicle.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment
giving priority to Central National. Although Community Bank had
filed its security agreement first in time, the court held that its security
interest did not take priority over the security interest of Central Na-
tional.4" Community Bank's failure to fie under the name shown on
37. 528 P.2d 710 (Okla. 1974).
38. A manufacturer's certificate of origin is a document which is evidence of ownership of the
vehicle. It is assigned to the purchaser by the manufacturer, the distributor, or the licensed dealer
of the vehicle. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 23.3 (1971). For an example of this document see Appendix.
39. A certificate of title must be obtained from the Commission or its agent before a certifi-
cate of registration and a vehicle license plate can be issued. Id.
40. Before July 1, 1979, the application procedure varied depending on whether the vehicle
had previously been registered in any state. For vehicles previously registered, the application
required disclosure of any lien or encumbrance. For vehicles never before registered, the applica-
tion did not require such disclosure. Although the disclosure requirements varied, the variance
was of no importance here because no provision was made for noting the lien or encumbrance on
the certificate itself. Only upon the transfer of ownership of the vehicle was the owner required to
state on the certificate all liens or encumbrances. Dissing v. Jones, 85 Ariz. 139, , 333 P.2d 725,
727 (1958); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 23.6 (1971).
41. 528 P.2d at 713. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) which provides the priority rule for secured
parties who perfect their security interests by filing. See also note 21 supra.
[Vol. 14:770
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the certificate prevented it from having a perfected security interest in
the car.42 Had Community Bank's security interest been noted on the
certificate itself, the debtor might have been prevented from obtaining
five loans on the security of one car. Such a notation would have
alerted subsequent parties to prior security interests. The 1979 amend-
ment to the Motor Vehicle Title Act attempted to remedy the deficiency
illustrated by this case as well as other deficiencies of the U.C.C. filing
procedure.43
B. The Law from July 1 to July 28, 1978
Before detailing the substance of the 1979 amendment to the Mo-
tor Vehicle Title Act,44 it is necessary to discuss the effective date and
duration of the 1977 Law45 in light of the 1978 act. Although section 8
of the 1979 Law repealed portions of both the 1977 and 1978 Laws, 46
this repealer provision was ineffective until July 1, 1979.41 Conse-
quently, it did not prevent the 1977 act from going into effect for a
limited time.
As originally passed the 1977 act was to be effective July 1, 1978.48
Prior to that date, however, the legislature passed the 1978 act, section 3
of which changed the effective date of the 1977 Law to June 30, 1979.49
Unfortunately, section 4 of the 1978 Law provided that the entire 1978
act, including the effective date change for the 1977 Law, was effective
beginning July 1, 1979.50 No specific provision was made by the legis-
lature for section 3 of the 1978 Law to become effective earlier than the
rest of the 1978 Law. Consequently, if the 1978 act was read literally,
section 3 would serve no useful function since it would be effective no
earlier than the date on which the 1978 Law was to supersede the 1977
Law. Arguably then, the 1977 Law went into effect as originally
42. 528 P.2d at 713.
43. See notes 88-125 infra and accompanying text.
44. 1979 Law, supra note 2.
45. 1977 Law. supra note 9.
46. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 8.
47. Id. § 10.
48. 1977 Law, supra note 9, § 23.3, at 1041.
49. 1978 Law, supra note 15, § 23.3, at 1042.
50. The effective date of the 1978 Law was omitted when codified. It may be found in the
Session Laws. Act of April 4, 1978, ch. 135, § 4, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws 243. When used in a
legislative enactment, the word "act" generally refers to the whole statute enacted. Board of
Trustees of Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund v. Templeton, 184 Okla. 281, 283, 86 P.2d 1000,
1002 (1939).
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planned on July 1, 1978, and remained in effect until July 1, 1979, when
the 1979 act became effective.
An alternative interpretation of the 1978 Law was provided by an
opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General."' The opinion suggested
that the legislative intent behind section 3 of the 1978 act was to delay
implementation of the 1977 Law until June 30, 1979.52 Any literal in-
terpretation which defeated that intent was clearly erroneous and was
to be avoided. According to the Attorney General, an interpretation
which best effectuated the legislative intent was one which permitted
section 3 of the 1978 Law to go into effect earlier than the rest of the
1978 act. From this premise the Attorney General concluded that sec-
tion 3 of the 1978 act was effective at the earliest, constitutionally per-
missible time-July 28, 1978.53 Thus as of July 28, 1978, section 3 of
the 1978 Law operated to postpone the effectiveness of the 1977 Law
until June. 30, 1979.14
In resolving statutory ambiguities, Oklahoma courts generally
have preferred a statutory construction 55 that renders every word,
phrase, and clause operative. 6 Such a construction is preferrable to
51. OKLA. ATT'Y GEN. Op., No. 78-218 (June 30, 1978) [hereinafter cited as OKLA. ATT'Y
GEN. OP.].
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Contemporaneous administrative construction of a statute by executive officers who are
charged with the duty of executing the law is generally accorded great respect, and should ordina-
rily control the construction given to the statute by the courts. See Crosbie v. Partridge, 85 Okla.
186, 192, 205 P. 758, 763 (1922). The administrative construction must be acted upon and acqui-
esced in for a long time by the legislature before it is given any meaningful consideration by the
courts. See Watson v. State Election Bd., 302 P.2d 134, 138 (Okla. 1956) (quoting 82 C.J.S. Stat-
utes § 359 (1955)). Consistent agency interpretation is not legally binding on the courts, but rather
is only persuasive evidence of the statute's meaning. Clinkenbeard v. Frazier, 582 P.2d 413, 414-
15 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
55. The basic goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and to effectuate the true intent of
the legislature. See, e.g., Tannehill v. Special Indem. Fund, 538 P.2d 590, 592 (Okla. 1975);
Becknell v. State Indus. Court, 512 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Okla. 1973). Initially this must be accom-
plished by analyzing the actual language of the entire statute. See, e.g., Special Indem. Fund v.
Harold, 398 P.2d 827, 830 (Okla. 1964); In re Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 365 P.2d 345, 355 (Okla.
1961). If the statutory language is susceptible of only one interpretation, then further judicial
construction is impermissible, Oldham v. Drummond Bd. of Educ. of Indep. School Dist., 542
P.2d 1309, 1311 (Okla. 1975), and the language must be followed without additional inquiry. See
Estate of Kasishke v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 541 P.2d 848, 851 (Okla. 1975); Johnson v. Ward,
541 P.2d 182, 185 (Okla. 1975). If, however, several meanings can be gleaned from the language,
then rules of construction may be used to resolve the doubt and ambiguity. See, e.g., Price v. Shell
Oil Co., 199 Okla. 193, 195, 185 P.2d 211, 212 (1947); Russett School Dist. v. Askew, 193 Okla.
102, 103, 141 P.2d 575, 577 (1943). See generally 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 45.02 (4th rev. ed. 1973). Because the 1978 act can reasonably be interpreted in
several different ways, resort to interpretive rules is essential to ascertain the intent of the legisla-
ture.
56. See, e.g., Street v. Bethany Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund Bd., 555 P.2d 1295, 1298
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one rendering some words nugatory. 7 Clearly a literal interpretation
of the 1978 act would render section 3 a nullity.5" The Attorney Gen-
eral's interpretation, however, which permits section 3 of the 1978 act
to become effective earlier than the remainder of the act, gives each
section of the 1978 act some meaning.
Further support for the Attorney General's interpretation can be
derived from an examination of the title of the 1978 act.59 The value of
this interpretive aid is enhanced because of the Oklahoma constitu-
tional mandate that the subject of every act must be expressed in its
title.60  Because Oklahoma courts have construed this constitutional
provision to require "that thepurpose of the act be clearly expressed in
its title,"' 6' the subject of the act, as defined by the title, should provide
useful insight into the legislative intent behind the statute.62
The title of the 1978 act indicates that one of the statute's purposes
was to delay "implementation of certain laws."63 Since the 1978 act is
amending only the provisions of the 1977 act, it is reasonable to infer
that the title manifests a legislative intention to delay implementation
of the 1977 act. It is important to note, however, that no language is
present in the title which indicates that the provisions of the 1978 act
were to go into effect at different times.64 Nor is there an indication
that the legislature declared an emergency which would allow the
whole statute or a specific section of it to go into effect upon the legisla-
ture's approval of the act.65 Thus, while it is clear that the title supports
the Attorney General's conclusion that the legislature intended to post-
(Okla. 1976); General Motors Corp. v. Cook, 528 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Okla. 1974); Hamrick v.
George, 378 P.2d 324, 327 (Okla. 1963).
57. See, e.g., Street v. Bethany Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund Bd., 555 P.2d 1295 1298
(Okla. 1976); City of Tulsa v. Goins, 437 P.2d 257, 259 (Okla. 1967); Spurrier v. Mallouf, 184
Okla. 251, 252, 86 P.2d 995, 997 (1939).
58. See OKLA. Ai'Y GEN. Op., supra note 51, at 2.
59. When interpreting an ambiguous statute, the title of the act is often a valuable aid in
ascertaining the intent of the legislature. See Irwin v. Irwin, 433 P.2d 931, 934 (Okla. 1965); State
ex rel Bd. of Educ. v. Morley, 168 Okla. 259, 262, 34 P.2d 258, 263 (1934). See generally 2A
SANDS, supra note 55, § 47.03.
60. OKLA. CONsT. art. 5, § 57.
61. Irwin v. Irwin, 433 P.2d 931, 934 (Okla. 1965) (emphasis added). See a/so Brown v. State,
266 P.2d 988, 990 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
62. See Oklahoma City v. Prieto, 482 P.2d 919, 924 (Okla. 1971).
63. 1978 Law, .supra note 15, at 243 (title of act).
64. This is significant because the purpose of the statute, as derived from the title, must be
ascertained without reference to the text of the act. Oklahoma courts have consistently stated that
the title of an act "must be construed with reference to the language used in it alone and not in the
light of what the body of the act contains." Oklahoma City v. Prieto, 482 P.2d 919, 924 (Okla.
1971) (citation omitted). Accord, Caywood v. Caywood, 541 P.2d 188, 190 (Okla. 1975).
65. See notes 81-84 infra and accompanying text.
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pone the effective date of the 1977 act,66 it cannot be said, with the
same degree of certainty, that the title supports the view that section 3
of the 1978 act went into effect earlier than the rest of the 1978 Law.67
Likewise, it is also clear that a literal interpretation of the 1978 act can-
not be supported by reference to its title68 since section 3, under a literal
analysis, would be ineffective as a delaying mechanism. Therefore,
while the 1978 act's title offers some insight into the legislature's intent,
it does not completely resolve the ambiguity surrounding the effective
date of the 1977 act.
Oklahoma courts generally have favored a statutory construction
which not only is sensible but also alleviates the evils intended to be
avoided by the legislature.69 The Attorney General noted that at the
time the 1977 act was originally scheduled to go into effect, July 1,
1978, the Oklahoma Tax Commission had insufficient manpower and
procedure to effectively administer the new method of perfecting secur-
ity interests in vehicles.70 From this fact the Attorney General sug-
gested that it was the legislature's intention to avoid a situation where
lending institutions refused to make loans to consumers due to the non-
existence of a complete perfection procedure and the concomitant in-
ability to properly perfect their security interests.71  Thus the evil
sought to be avoided by the legislature, according to the Attorney Gen-
eral, was the economic damage resulting from an incomplete perfection
procedure becoming the governing law.72
In interpreting a statute, the circumstances existing at the time it
was passed and the evil sought to be prevented by the legislature must
be considered.73 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the Attor-
ney Generars interpretation of legislative intent, a desire to delay im-
plementation of the 1977 Law, is infinitely more sensible than a literal
interpretation of the 1978 Law which tends to perpetuate the evil by
66. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
67. The interpretation given to the title will not control the plain, unambiguous words of the
statute. See Jones v. Hopkins, 9 Okla. 133, 154, 59 P. 976, 982 (1899). Arguably, section 4 of the
1978 act clearly indicates that the whole law will go into effect at the same time.
68. See text following note 50 supra.
69. AMF Tubescope Co. v. Hatchel, 547 P.2d 374, 379 (Okla. 1976); Dowell v. Board of
Educ., 185 Okla. 342, 344, 91 P.2d 771, 774 (1939). See Otjen v. Mayhue, 476 P.2d 317, 321-22
(Okla. 1970).
70. OKLA. ATr'y GEN. Op., supra note 51, at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Champlin Ref. Co., 341 U.S. 290, 297 (1951); Russett School Dist. v.
Askew, 193 Okla. 102, 104, 141 P.2d 575, 577 (1943); In re Martin's Estate, 183 Okla. 177, 179, 80
P.2d 561, 563 (1938).
[Vol. 14:770
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allowing the 1977 Law to remain effective for a full year. Unfortu-
nately the analysis of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
the 1978 statute, like the analysis of the act's title,74 only tends to sup-
port the Attorney General's major premise that the legislature intended
to delay implementation of the 1977 Law.75 It does not fully support
the Attorney General's minor premise that the legislature intended sec-
tion 3 of the 1978 act to have a different effective date than the rest of
the 1978 Law.76
Notwithstanding the lack of firm support for the Attorney Gen-
eral's minor premise, once the legislature's basic intent has been deter-
mined, the law should be liberally construed to effectuate that intent.77
Because the legislative intent must prevail over the literal import of the
statutory language employed,78 Oklahoma courts may modify, alter, or
supply words to give the statute the effect which the legislature envi-
sioned.79 Thus, despite the lack of express support for allowing the
1978 act's sections to become effective at different times, it is clear that
the 1978 act must be interpreted in this manner to properly implement
the legislative desire to delay the effectiveness of the 1977 act.
Once it is determined that section 3 of the 1978 Law was effective
earlier than the remainder of the 1978 act, the second step is to ascer-
74. See notes 59-68 supra and accompanying text.
75. To support this major premise, the Attorney General relies on a June 27, 1978, resolution
of the Oklahoma Senate Committee on Revenue and Taxation. This reliance is misplaced for two
reasons. First, the resolution was issued after the 1978 amendment had been passed by both
houses of the legislature. Thus it cannot be used to prove the intention of the legislature a few
months earlier. Second, and more importantly, "It]he legislature's intention can only be shown by
its vote." Davis v. Childers, 181 Okla. 468, 471, 74 P.2d 930, 933 (1938). Accord, Haynes v.
Caporal, 571 P.2d 430, 434 (Okla. 1977). See Continental Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 494
P.2d 650, 653-54 (Okla. 1972) (Statements of Tax Commission lawyers who participated in draft-
ing the statute are incompetent for purpose of interpreting a statute.).
76. To support the minor premise, the Attorney General relied partially on Harris v. Dun-
gan, 199 Okla. 350, 185 P.2d 949 (1947). Harris, however, is distinguishable from the present
situation. In Harris the Oklahoma Supreme Court was faced with a statute which was to be
effective immediately upon approval due to a legislative declaration of an emergency. Id. at 351,
185 P.2d at 951. One of the provisions of the act dealt with the sale or purchase of real estate.
Because of a constitutional provision prohibiting application of an emergency clause to such pro-
visions, OKLA. CO sT. art. 5, § 58, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that part of the statute
would go into effect at a date subsequent to the time originally stated by the legislature. Id. at 352,
185 P.2d at 951. The present situation is different in that a court, following the Attorney General's
opinion, would have to put section 3 of the 1978 Law into effect at an earlier time than the legisla-
ture originally stated.
77. See In re Captain's Estate, 191 Okla. 463, 464, 130 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1942).
78. See Keck v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 188 Okla. 257, 259, 108 P.2d 162, 164 (1940).
79. See, e.g., Midwest City v. Harris, 561 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Okla. 1977); Russell v. Flanagan,
544 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1975); Wray v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 442 P.2d 309,
311 (Okla. 1968); Curtis v. Registered Dentists, 193 Okla. 233, 235, 143 P.2d 427, 429 (1943);
Welch v. Simmons, 190 Okla. 611, 613, 126 P.2d 89, 91 (1942).
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tain the exact date that section 3 became effective. The Oklahoma
Constitution contains a provision which states that "[n]o act shall take
effect until ninety (90) days after the adjournment of the session at
which it was passed. unless, in case of emergency, to be expressed
in the act, the legislature . . . so directs . ... -80 The 1978 act con-
tained no emergency clause;8' consequently the earliest time that sec-
tion 3 could constitutionally have been effective was ninety days after
the legislative session in which it was enacted. 82 The pertinent legisla-
tive session ended on April 28, 1978.83 Therefore, section 3 of the 1978
act became effective July 28, 1978.84
Despite section 3 of the 1978 .act being effective earlier than the
rest of the 1978 Law, it did not deter the 1977 act from becoming the
law as originally planned on July 1, 1978.85 Only twenty-seven days
later did section 3 of the 1978 act have the effect of amending the effec-
tive date provision of the 1977 Law. Thus from July 1, 1978, through
July 27, 1978, the 1977 Law governed the perfection procedure in
Oklahoma. On July 28, 1978, when the 1978 act's section 3 amended
the effective date of the 1977 Law to June 30, 1979, the U.C.C. perfec-
tion procedure86 became the controlling law in the absence of a certifi-
cate statute. On Saturday, June 30, 1979, the 1977 Law again became
the controlling law until the next day, July 1, 1979, when the 1979 act
superseded the perfection provisions of the 1977 and 1978 Laws.
87
80. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 58.
81. There are no reported Oklahoma cases which indicate that a court would supply an emer-
gency clause if it found that the legislature may have neglected to supply one when it enacted the
statute.
82. For an example of the method of calculating this ninety day period, see generally
Leatherock v. Lawter, 45 Okla. 715, 147 P. 324 (1915); Holcombe v. Lawyer's Co-operative Pub-
lishing Co., 35 Okla. 260, 143 P. 1046 (1912).
83. OKLA. STAT. at viii (Supp. 1978).
84. See generally OKLA. ATr'Y GEN. Op., supra note 51, at 4.
85. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 29-34 supra and acompanying text.
87. 1979 Law, supra note 2, §§ 8, 10. Due to the Tax Commission's inability to properly
implement the 1977 Law, most secured parties between July 1, 1978 and July 28, 1978, probably
filed financing statements according to the U.C.C. filing provisions. Because the U.C.C. filing and
perfection provisions were not legally effective during that period, these secured parties remained
unperfected until July 28 at which time filing was again the correct method of perfection. See
note 86 supra and accompanying text. While it is unlikely that more than one security interest was
created in the same vehicle during this period, the potential for conflicting security interests ex-
isted. Consequently, the issue of priority between these conflicting interests must be addressed.
The lack of an effective method of perfecting a security interest is significant when a priority
dispute arises between two secured parties who attempted to perfect under the U.C.C. during the
twenty-seven day period in which the 1977 Law was effective. If the two secured parties filed
financing statements, neither was properly perfected until July 28. Despite both parties becoming
perfected at the same time, the secured party who filed first should be given priority under U.C.C.
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C. The Law After July 1, 1979
The 1979 amendment to the Motor Vehicle Title Act,"8 which be-
came effective July 1, 1979,s9 simplifies the perfection process for se-
cured parties who hold security interests in vehicles. The key provision
of this act requires the secured party to deliver certain forms and a fee
to the Commission as the only prerequisites to perfection. Concomi-
tantly, the 1979 Law minimizes the effectiveness of a U.C.C. filing by
abolishing the necessity of filing a financing statement to perfect a se-
§ 9-312(5)(a). This section provides that between two conflicting security interests, both of which
are perfected by filing, priority is to be given to the party who filed first regardless of which
security interest attached first.
Arguably, Oklahoma courts may find § 9-312(5)(a) to be inapplicable in this situation. By
reading the § 9-312(5)(a) language "are perfected by filing" to mean should have perfected by
filing, subsection (5)(a) would be inapplicable. Secured parties should have perfected by notation.
Subsection (5)(b) would then be the controlling priority provision. Subsection (5)(b) provides for
priority in the order of perfection where both secured parties are not perfected by filing. Since
both secured parties were eventually perfected on July 28, it could be argued that they should
share pro rata in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-315(2) is evidence of a Code policy to allow for pro
rata sharing under appropriate circumstances. That section, however, deals solely with commin-
gled or processed goods and provides for a pro rata ranking of security interests in the event of a
priority dispute over the product or mass.
88. 1979 Law, supra note 2. In the 1979 Law, the legislature used the terms lien and security
interest interchangeably. See note 23 supra for the Code's definition of security interest. For a
security interest in a motor vehicle held by a dealer for sale or lease, perfection is still governed by
the filing provisions of Article 9 of the U.C.C. rather than by the 1979 act. See 1979 Law, supra
note 2, § 6(A)(1). See generally In re Vaughan, 283 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D. Tenn. 1968); Guy
Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 14 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 40, 47 (Colo. 1974);
Guardian Discount Co. v. Settles, 114 Ga. App. 418, -, 151 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1966); Associates
Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546, 549 (rex. 1970). One court has held
that a security interest in used or trade-in inventory vehicles must also be perfected by a Code
filing even though a certificate may have been issued. In re Vaughan, 283 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D.
Tenn. 1968).
A number of the 1979 Law's sections do not deal specifically with perfection. Section 6(B) of
the act provides the method for releasing a satisfied security interest. Upon satisfaction of the
debt, the secured party has the obligation to provide a written release to the debtor and to the
Commission within fifteen business days. After the release, the owner may obtain a new certifi-
cate which omits reference to the security interest. This section appears to impose an affirmative
duty on the secured party. Compare § (6)(B) with U.C.C. § 9-404(1) (providing that only on writ-
ten demand by the debtor must the secured party send the debtor a statement that he or she no
longer claims a security interest). Unless a written demand is sent by the debtor to the secured
party, the latter has no duty to file a release or termination statement under § 9-404. See, e.g.,
Texas Kenworth Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 564 P.2d 222, 227 (Okla. 1977). To the extent that
U.C.C. § 9-404 is inconsistent with the release provision of the 1979 Law, it has been repealed.
1979 Law, supra note 2, § 9.
Sections 6(D) and 6(E) of the 1979 Law acknowledge the continued validity of security inter-
ests properly perfected prior to July 1, 1979.
To insure priority in the event of the debtor's default, it is especially important that prospec-
tive secured parties check the county clerk's office, the certificate, and the Commission to establish
if there is a perfected security interest in the vehicle. U.C.C. § 9-403(2) provides that a filed
financing statement is effective for five years from the date of filing.
89. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(a)(1).
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curity interest in a vehicle.9" Although the perfection provisions of the
Code are replaced by the requirements of the certificate law, the Code
provisions regulating the creation, validity, and attachment of vehicle
security interests, the priority between conflicting security interests, and
the debtor's default are not supplanted by the 1979 act.9'
1. Alternative Interpretations of the 1979 Law
Statutory recognition of bypass to the U.C.C. perfection provisions
when dealing with security interests in vehicles is found in U.C.C. § 9-
302. While this section provides the Code's general rule of filing, sub-
section (3)(b) defers to any applicable certificate of title statute.92 The
90. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b), (4); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-302, U.C.C. comment 8 (West
1963). State courts have upheld this interaction of Article 9 of the U.C.C. with a certificate law
similar to the 1979 act. See Harper v. Avco Financial Servs., Inc., 124 Ga. App. 6,_, 183 S.E.2d
89, 90 (1971); Peterson v. Ziegler, 39 IIL. App. 3d 379, -, 350 N.E.2d 356, 360 (1976); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Birkett L. Williams, Co., 243 N.E.2d 882, 887 (Ohio 1969); Associates
Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1970); Apeco Corp. v. Bishop
Mobile Homes, Inc., 506 S.W.2d 711, 717 (rex. Ct. App. 1974).
Clearly delivery, not filing, is the prerequisite to perfection under the 1979 Law. Neverthe-
less, for the purpose of giving notice to third parties, the secured party may file a financing state-
ment. See Opinion ofthe Attorney Gen., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 924 (Kan. 1966), which states that
when a financing statement covering a motor vehicle is presented to the filing officer, accompanied
by the proper fee, it is the officer's duty to file it even though such filing is not effective for perfec-
tion. It is important to note, however, that a secured party who only files a financing statement
under the 1979 Law will be subordinate to a subsequent secured party who delivers the required
items to the Commission. See Staley v. Phelan Finance Corp., 116 Ga. App. 1, -, 156, S.E.2d
201, 202 (1967). See also note 13 supra.
91. See Morris Plan Co. v. Moody, 266 Cal. App. 2d 28, _, 72 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (1968);
Peterson v. Ziegler, 39 Ill. App. 3d 379, -, 350 N.E.2d 356, 359 (1976); In re Butler's Tire &
Battery Co., 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1363, 1366 (D. Ore. 1975); In re Reese, 1 U.C.C. REP. SFav.
450, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Just as a financing statement cannot be substituted for a security agree-
ment if it lacks language which creates a security interest, the certificate cannot be used as a
security agreement if there is no evidence of the debtor's intent to create a security interest in the
secured party. In re Shelton, 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1973); In re E.F. Ander-
son & Son, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 567, 571 (M.D. Ga. 1973); First County Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Canna, 124 N.J. Super. 154, -, 305 A.2d 442, 445 (App. Div. 1973). But see Mertz Estate,
24 Pa. D. & C.2d 755, , I U.C.C. REP. SERV. 452, 453 (1961), in which a notated certificate was
found to suffice for a security agreement.
92. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b) provides that "[t]he filing provisions of this article do not apply to a
security interest in property subject to... a statute of this state which provides for central filing
of, or which requires indication on a certificate of title of, such security interests in such property."
Subsection (3)(b) is not an explicit guide into the pertinent certificate statute. Compared with
other states, Oklahoma is lagging behind in the modernization of Article 9. Most of the twenty-
three states which have adopted the 1972 amendment to § 9-302 make explicit cross-reference to
certificate statutes in their versions of § 9-302(3)(b). Those twenty-three states are Arizona, Ar-
kansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Current Materials, U.C.C. REP. SERV. (1978) (Introductory
Note to Article 9).
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provision of the 1979 certificate law which deals with perfection pro-
vides that
except for a security interest in motor vehicles held by a
dealer for sale or lease . . . a security interest .. in a vehicle
shall be perfected only when a lien entry form. and the
existing certificate of title, if any, or application for a certifi-
cate of title and manufacturer's certificate of origin containing
the name and address of the secured party and the date of the
security agreement and the required fee are delivered to the
Oklahoma Tax Commission or one of its motor license
agents.93
This provision changes not only the place of filing but also the
documents to be filed. In lieu of filing a financing statement with the
county clerk as required under the Code, the secured party now deliv-
ers to the Commission or its agent a lien entry form, any existing certifi-
cate of title, or an application for such a certificate along with the
manufacturer's certificate of origin94 and the required fee.95 Delivery
of these documents is the only requirement in the single subsection
dealing with perfection.96 Thus under one interpretation of the 1979
93. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(A)(1) (emphasis added). The 1979 Law's delivery method of
perfection can be contrasted with the perfection provisions of the 1977 act. See 1977 Law, supra
note 9, § 23.3(B), at 1040. Under the 1977 act, the secured party perfected a security interest in a
vehicle by presenting certain items to the Commission and by having the Commission issue a
certificate on which the security interest and the name and address of the secured party were
noted. Actual notation of the security interest on the certificate by the Commission represented
the time of perfection. The method of perfection under the 1977 Law consisted of delivery of
certain items, notation of the security interest on the certificate, and issuance of the certificate. See
id Nearby states which make actual notation on the certificate the method of perfection include
Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Texas. See Ward, supra note 7, at 258 n.21.
94. For examples of these documents see Appendix.
95. One technical requirement of the perfection process deserves mention. The statute re-
quires that the date of the security agreement be supplied as part of the information about the
security interest. Omission of the date leaves the security interest unperfected. This date, how-
ever, need not be noted on the certificate. Only the lien, the date of receipt of the lien entry form,
and an assigned number must be recorded on the certificate. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(A)(1),
(3). Connecticut has a law similar to Oklahoma's new statute which has been interpreted in this
manner. See In re McGovern, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 234, 237 (D. Conn. 1969) (certificate law's
requirement of security agreement's date on application cannot be read into Code to invalidate an
undated security agreement); In re Bassett, 5 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 279, 283 (D. Conn. 1967) (total
omission of date leaves security interest unperfected); In re Benson, 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 272, 274
(D. Conn. 1966) (substantial portion of date must appear on application). By requiring notation
of this minimum amount of information, the certificate law is consistent with the Code's policy to
only put subsequent parties on notice of prior claimants. See In re Littlejohn, 519 F.2d 356, 358
(10th Cir. 1975). See generally note 29 supra. See also U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (date of execution not
essential part of written security agreement).
96. The secured party's duties may not end upon delivery of the documents to the Commis-
sion. When a security interest is created in a vehicle which has previously been registered in the
debtor's name and on which all the taxes due the state have been paid, the secured party has the
16
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statute, delivery could be considered the sole prerequisite for perfection
of a security interest in a vehicle.9
7
An alternative interpretation exists, however, when the 1979 act is
read in conjunction with the pertinent U.C.C. provisions. This ap-
proach requires, in addition to delivery, notation of the security interest
on the certificate to achieve perfection.98 The source of this argument
is U.C.C. section 9-302(4). This section provides that a security interest
in property covered by a certificate statute "can be perfected only...
by indication of the security interest on a certificate of title. . . ,.9 By
reading the 1979 certificate law and the Code provision together, as
suggested by section 9-302(4), perfection is completed only upon actual
notation.l'° Thus, if the certificate is not noted with the security inter-
est, the secured party is unperfected.
Because notice to subsequent parties underlies the perfection con-
cept,10' the strongest policy argument in favor of making notation a
part of the perfection process is that it provides better notice than
merely a delivery prerequisite to perfection. Arguably, a reason for re-
jecting the U.C.C. filing procedure for security interests in vehicles is its
inefficiency in providing notice to subsequent parties. Moreover, it is
totally inadequate when a misfiling occurs.'0 2 By requiring only deliv-
ery of certain items to achieve perfection, a delivery method of perfec-
tion appears to give no better notice than under the U.C.C.
Conversely, by making notation of the security interest on the certifi-
cate an additional prerequisiste to perfection, potential secured parties
added burden of personally obtaining a new certificate on which the security interest has been
recorded. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(A)(5). The secured party must then return the new certifi-
cate to the debtor. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(A)(4). In contrast, for a vehicle never before
registered in the debtor's name, the secured party need not personally obtain a certificate and
convey it to the debtor. Presumably, only the Commission has the duty in that situation to send
the certificate to the debtor. See id
97. Delivery is not defined by the certificate statute. Nevertheless, its meaning can be deter-
mined by analogizing to U.C.C. § 9-403(1). To accomplish a Code filing, this section requires
only that the financing statement and the filing fee be presented to the filing officer. Likewise,
delivery under the certificate statute should be deemed complete when the forms and fee are
placed in the possession of the Commission.
98. For an analogous result under a similar statutory scheme, see Ferguson v. Morgan, 14
N.C. App. 520,_, 188 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1972). But see notes 105-11 infra and accompanying text.
99. U.C.C. § 9-302(4) (emphasis added).
100. Ward, stura note 7, at 260.
101. See Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700, 704 (10th Cir. 1972); In re
Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799, 802 (W.D. Okla. 1975); National Trailer Convoy Co. v. Mount Vernon
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 420 P.2d 889, 893 (Okla. 1966). See general,, J. WHITE & R. SUMERs,
supra note 21, § 23-5.
102. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:770
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are immediately and efficiently informed of prior security interests
without the need for further checking.1 3 In addition, a misfiling of the
pertinent documents does not prevent notice to subsequent parties if
notation of the security interest on the certificate is properly made." 
Despite the need for efficient notice of prior security interests to
subsequent parties, actual notation of the security interest on the certifi-
cate should not be a prerequisite to perfection under the 1979 Law.
Three arguments support this position. First, the language of the stat-
ute is explicit. It states that "a security interest. . . in a vehicle shall be
perfected only when. . . [specific items] are delivered to the Oklahoma
Tax Commission ... 1o5 Additionally, the subsection of the 1979
statute which deals with notation does not mention perfection. It states
that "[t]he Commission. . . shall have the duty to record the lien upon
the face of the certificate of title issued at the time of registering and
paying all fees and taxes due on such vehicle."' 1 6 Thus, the statute
does not expressly require notation as a step in the perfection process.
Second, the main function of U.C.C. § 9-302(4) is to allow for
perfection under the procedures outlined in a certificate statute. I0 7
Consequently, the method of perfection should be controlled by the
certificate statute and not by the Code. 08 This argument is especially
cogent because the 1978 act is the most recent mandate of the legisla-
ture. Moreover, when the language of the 1979 Law was revised, the
legislature could have specifically required, as in the 1977 Law, both
delivery and notation as prerequisites to perfection. 0 9 Conversely, sec-
tion 9-302(4) is part of the 1962 version of the Code which was enacted
in Oklahoma in 1963. The legislature may not have intended a refer-
103. Under a notation method, visually checking a certificate of title is a simple and efficient
way of ascertaining the existence of prior security interests in a vehicle. This method of providing
notice is inadequate, however, when more than one certificate of title exists for a vehicle. If multi-
ple certificates exist, there is the potential for a fraud known as the "Duplicate Title" racket. See
generally Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 455,
476 (1948). Both the 1977 and 1979 Laws contain a central filing provision which substantially
eliminates this problem. See notes 123-25 infra and accompanying text.
104. A report of any processed lien entry form and a duplicate of any issued certificate of title
are sent to the Commission following notation of the security interest on the certificate. 1979 Law,
supra note 2, § 6(C).
105. Id. § 6(A)(1).
106. Id. § 6(A)(7).
107. Ward, supra note 7, at 261.
108. See I G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 20.8, at 577.
109. As delivery, notation and issuance were the prerequisities to perfection under the 1977
act, 1977 Law, supra note 9, § 23.3(B), at 1040, obviously the legislature was aware of the possible
perfection methods.
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ence back to section 9-302(4) for additional perfection requirements."t0
Third, by requiring only delivery to achieve perfection, the statute
is consistent with the Code's "race of diligence" approach."' To a
large degree, the secured party controls the delivery of the proper forms
and fee to the Commission. Once the delivery requirement is satisfied,
however, the secured party can personally do no more to assure nota-
tion of the security interest on the certificate. Requiring actual notation
for perfection only promotes insecurity in view of the possibility of neg-
ligence by a Commission agent in noting the security interest on the
certificate or the possibility of a time lag between delivery and notation.
Thus, under the better interpretation of the 1979 Law, delivery is
the sole prerequisite to perfection. Not only does the statutory lan-
guage expressly support this interpretation, but this approach also re-
flects the most recent legislative revision of the perfection procedure.
In addition, a delivery method protects the diligent secured party who
has done all that he or she can do to assure notation of the security
interest on the certificate. While the notation required by the statute
serves a critical notice function and while its importance should not be
underestimated, it is not a prerequisite to perfection. Delivery of the
specified items to the Commission is the sole requirement in the 1979
Law's perfection process.
2. Comparison of the 1977 and 1979 Laws
Delivery as the method of perfection under the 1979 Law elimi-
nates the timing problem which existed under the 1977 Law's perfec-
tion procedure." 2 Under the latter method of perfection, delivery of
certain items to the Commission, notation of the security interest on the
certificate of title and issuance of the certificate to the debtor were pre-
requisites to perfection." 3 Failing to note or improperly noting the se-
curity interest on the certificate of title, or failing to issue the noted
110. Reliance on a certificate law for the perfection procedure to the exclusion of the U.C.C. is
suggested by a number of authorities. See In re Manufacturers Credit Corp., 441 F.2d 1313, 1317
(3d Cir. 1971); Maley v. National Acceptance Co., 250 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ga. 1966); In re
Butler's Tire & Battery Co., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1363, 1366 (D. Ore. 1975); In re Smith, 6 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 860, 866 (W.D. Va. 1969); Morris Plan Co. v. Moody, 266 Cal. App. 2d 28,-, 72 Cal
Rptr. 123, 125 (1968); Stanley v. Phelan Finance Corp., 116 Ga. App. 1, _, 156 S.E.2d 201, 202
(1967). Opinion ofihe.Aitorney Gen., 3 U.C.C. REP. SRV. 104 (Neb. 1965); Opinion oflheAlorney
Gen., I U.C.C. RaP. SERv. 742 (N.M. 1962).
111. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-312, U.C.C. comment 4 (West 1963). See note 21 supra
for a discussion of the "race of diligence" approach of the Code.
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certificate to the debtor left the secured party unperfected.11 4 Although
the 1979 Law provides for notation and issuance," 5 those acts are not
prerequisites to perfection." 6 Therefore, if the agent fails to complete
these acts, the secured party is nonetheless perfected. 17 While this as-
pect of the delivery method of perfection tends to frustrate the notice
function of perfection," 8 the legislature under the 1979 Law, like the
Code approach," I9 has favored the secured party who has done all that
he or she personally can to assure the perfection procedure is com-
114. The 1977 Law explicitly stated that notation was required for perfection. Unless the
security interest was noted on the certificate, the secured party who had done all that he or she
could do to achieve notation by delivering the proper items to the Commission was unperfected.
Several courts construing state certificate laws similar to the 1977 act have required actual nota-
tion to achieve perfection. See, e.g., In re Valley Contracting Co., 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1127 (E.D.
TENN. 1969); In re White Plumbing & Heating Co., 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 467, 468 (E.D. Tenn.
1969); In re McCroskey, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1394, 1395 (W.D. Va. 1976); Muir v. Jefferson
Credit Corp., 108 NJ. Super. 586,-__, 262 A.2d 33, 35 (1970); Ferguson v. Morgan, 14 N.C. App.
520, __, 188 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1972); Harry Cramer, Inc. v. Morris, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 747, 3 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 337 (1965); Commerce Union Bank v. Hunley, 10 U.C.C. REP SERV. 1252, 1257 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1972); Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 465 S.W.2d 933, 937
(ex. 1971). See generally Ward, supra note 7, at 258 n.21. This result is contrary to the Code's
approach when a financing statement is improperly filed or indexed. The Code provides that a
secured party becomes perfected despite an improper filing or indexing so long as his or her con-
duct did not cause the error by the filing officer. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-407, U.C.C.
comment 1 (West 1963). See In re Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1975). Under the
Code, once a secured party achieves perfection, subsequently perfected secured parties must bear
the risk of loss. This result is consistent with the Code's "race of diligence" approach. See note 21
supra. See also Mutual Bd. & Packaging Corp. v. Oneida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 342 F.2d 294,
297 (2d Cir. 1965), in which the court stated:
If one balances interests between a creditor who does his best to file and is prevented by
the clerk from doing so, and another who does his best to search and is prevented by the
clerk from finding what he is looking for, the loss may well be held to fall on the second
creditor rather than the first because of the first creditor's priority of effort.
On the question of who should bear the loss in the absence of negligence by the secured party, an
Opinion ofthe4ttorney Gen., I U.C.C. REP. SERV. 718, 728 (N.M. 1962), states that a county clerk
may be personally responsible for damages to individuals incurred by reason of the clerk's negli-
gent failure to perform his or her Code duties. Professor Welsh suggests that this approach would
probably be followed by most courts where the certificate statute makes delivery the prerequisite
to perfection and a subsequent secured party relies on a certificate which fails to note a security
interest due to an official's negligence. Welsh, supra note 7, at 291 n.108. Generally, the public
official charged with the issuance of certificates is required to post a bond to guarantee the faithful
performance of his or her duties and to indemnify the injured party. Id. at 291 n.109. In
Oklahoma, the public official charged with issuance of the certificate is the Commission agent.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 22.22(A) (Supp. 1978) provides that such an agent shall furnish a bond in an
amount fixed by the Commission.
115. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(A)(7).
116. See notes 105-11 supra and accompanying text.
117. Welsh, supra note 7, at 291. Cf Opinion ofthe,4ttorney Gem, 10 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 734
(Ky. 1972) (when county clerk negligently fails to note security interest on the certificate, but
security interest was properly perfected by filing, the perfected status of the security interest con-
tinues against transferees from the debtor who have no actual notice).
118. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
119. See U.C.C. § 9-403(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-403, Oklahoma Code comment 1
(West 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-407, U.C.C. comment I (West 1963).
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Although the 1979 Law makes delivery the method of perfection,
the time of perfection is not necessarily the date of the actual delivery
of the necessary items to the Commission. If the proper items are de-
livered within ten days after the date of execution of the lien entry
form, perfection relates back to the date of execution. If, however, de-
livery of the items is made more than ten days after the date of execu-
tion of the form, perfection begins on the date of delivery.' 2 1 In
contrast, the 1977 Law made actual notation of the security interest on
the certificate of title the time of perfection. 122
A provision common to both the 1977 and 1979 Laws requires the
Commission to file and index duplicates of all issued certificates. 23
Under both laws the Commission also receives information of all
processed lien entry forms. The names and addresses of prior secured
parties are then readily available to those who make legitimate inquir-
ies to the Commission. 24 While this central filing is not a prerequisite
to perfection, it is an additional source of information about security
interests which should help prevent fraudulent debtor practices.' 2
Thus, in contrast to the 1977 Law, the legislature under the 1979
Law has favored the secured party who has taken all the necessary
steps to procure notation and issuance of the certificate. Such a secured
120. See notes 105-11 supra and accompanying text.
121. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(A)(2).
122. 1977 Law, supra note 9, § 23.3(B) at 1040.
123. 1977 Law, supra note 9, § 23.3(D) at 1040; 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(C).
124. Names and addresses of assignees must also be available to those who make inquiries to
the Commission. 1979 Law, supra note 2, § 6(C). A perfected security interest in a vehicle contin-
ues to be perfected in an assignee without a notation of the assignment on the certificate. U.C.C.
§ 9-302(2). See In re Chapin, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 984, 990 (W.D. Mich. 1969). For a brief
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of central filing, see generally OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, § 9-401, U.C.C. comment 1 (West 1963); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, .Trra note 21, § 23-
11, at 818.
125. One of these fraudulent debtor practices is known as the "Duplicate Title" racket, See
Leary, Horse andBuggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 455, 476 (1948).
If the car owner holds an original certificate which is free of any security interests, liens, or encum-
brances, he or she could apply for a duplicate certificate of title by fraudulently claiming destruc-
tion of the original. After issuance of the duplicate, the car owner applies for a loan and gives a
security interest in the vehicle. The duplicate, which lacks any notation, is surrendered to the
secured party for notation of the interest. Subsequently, the car owner borrows elsewhere on the
strength of the same vehicle. For the second creditor, the owner produces the original certificate
which appears free of all interests. The second secured party has been duped into iving value
based upon the belief that he or she would have priority over other secured parties once the
certificate is noted. The first secured party, however, achieved notation first and therefore has
priority. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b). Under both the 1977 and 1979 Laws, the Commission would
have had a record of the security interest noted on the duplicate. For a variation on the "Dupli-
cate Title" racket, see Muir v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 108 N.J. Super. 586, 262 A.2d 33 (1970).
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party is perfected under the 1979 Law despite the Commission's failure
either to note or to issue the certificate. Moreover, the time of perfec-
tion under the 1979 Law is not the time the security interest is noted on
the certificate; rather, it is the date of execution of the lien entry form or
the date of the form's delivery to the Commission. Finally, under both
the 1977 and 1979 Laws, central filing and indexing of all issued certifi-
cates is mandated. This central filing provision should help prevent
fraudulent creation of multiple security interests in the same vehicle.
III. CONCLUSION
In thirteen months, secured parties in Oklahoma have been sub-
jected to four different laws relating to perfection of security interests in
vehicles. This places a heavy burden on those who seek information
concerning prior security interests in a vehicle. In the coming years,
secured parties must check in three places to properly determine the
existence of any prior security interests in the vehicle. First, the se-
cured party should check with the county clerk in the county of the
debtor's residence for a financing statement filed prior to July 1, 1979.
Second, any existing certificate of title should be inspected for security
interests noted after July 1, 1979. Third, the secured party should con-
tact the Commission to establish if any applications which contain se-
curity interests in the vehicle have been delivered to the Commission
and if the Commission has a duplicate certificate on file which is noted
with an existing security interest.
Despite taking these precautions, a secured party may still lose pri-
ority to a prior secured party who perfected under the 1979 Law. If
that prior secured party can prove that the proper forms and fee were
delivered to the Commission, even though the Commission is without
record of such a delivery, the prior secured party will be perfected.
Consequently, he or she will take priority over a diligent but subse-
quent secured party who is without notice of the interest.
By eliminating the requirement of filing a financing statement, by
requiring notation of the security interest on the certificate and by mak-
ing delivery the sole prerequisite to perfection, the legislature has
brought Oklahoma law more in line with modem commercial needs.
Although the procedure which a secured party must follow to achieve
perfection after July 1, 1979, will be similar to the filing of a financing
statement, there will eventually be a vast improvement in the notice
aspect of perfection. If the Commission agent properly fulfills the stat-
22
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utory requirements, subsequent parties will only need to glance at the
certificate of title to establish the status of the vehicle as collateral. The
new procedure promotes security for secured parties, reduces the risk of
fraudulent practices by debtors, and centralizes the pertinent records
concerning security interests perfected in Oklahoma vehicles.
Judi Ruffing
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TO A MOTOR VEHICLE
The undersigned CORPORATION hereby certifies that the new motor vehicle
described below, the property of said CORPORATION has been transferred













(DRY CHASSIS WEIGHT) CAPACITY
(GVW)
The CORPORATION further certifies that this was the first transfer of such
new motor vehicle in ordinary trade and commerce.
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FIRST ASSIGNMENT
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby transfers this Statement of Origin and the motor vehicle
described therein to
Address
and certifies that the vehicle is new and has not been registered in this or any other state; he also warrants the title
of said motor vehicle at time of delivery, subject to liens and encumbrances, If any, as set out below:
Amt. of Lien Date To Whom Due Address
Dated 19.-_., at
,By:
Transferor (Firm Name) Sign Here Position
Dealer's License No.
Before me personallyappeared who by me beingduly sworn upon oath says that the statements set forth above are true and correct,
Subscribed and sworn to before me this. day of _ 19.
Notary Public for County, State of
Notary Seal
SECOND ASSIGNMENT
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby transfers this Statement of Origin and the motor vehiclo
described therein to
Address
and certifies that the vehicle is new and has not been registered in this or any other state; he also warrants the title
of said motor vehicle at time of delivery, subject to iens and encumbrances, If any, as set out below:
Amt. of Lien Date To Whom Due Address
Dated 19..-, at
By:
Transferor (Firm Name) Sign Here Position
Dealer's License No.
Before me personally appeared who by me being
duly sworn upon oath says that the statements set forth above are true and correct.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of _g._
Notary Public for County, State of
Notary Seal
THIRD ASSIGNMENT
FOR -VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby transfers this Statement of Origin and the motor vehicle
described therein to
Address
and certifies that the vehicle is new and has not been registered in this or any other state; he also warrants the title
of said motor vehicle at time of deivery, subject to liens and encumbrances, If any, as set out below:
Amt. of Lien Date To Whom Due Address-
Dated 19-, at
-By:
Transferor (Firm Name) Sign Here Position
Dealer's License No.
Before me personally appeared _who by me beingduly sworn upon oath says that the statements set forth above are true and correct.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of _ 19__...__
Notary Public for _County, State of_.
Notary Seal
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APPENDIX B
701-6-R77 PLACE
APPLICATION FOR OKLAHOMA CERTIFICATE MOTOR VEHICLE
OF TITLE FOR A VEHICLE TAX STAMP
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FEE $1.75 HERE
MODEL YEAR AND MAKE
BODY TYPE
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
YEAR MADE TITLE NUMBER
EXCISE TAX RECEIPT LICENSE TAG
FACT. DEL. PRICE (LICENSE) $
TOTAL DEL. PRICE (EXCISE) $
MODEL NUMBER
DATE FIRST SOLD BY DEALER
NAME
STREET CITY_
COUNTY STATE ZIP -
THIS MOTOR VEHICLE IS SUBJECT TO A LIEN IN FAVOR OF:
CITY STATE
AMOUNT OF LIEN $ DATE OF LIEN
PREVIOUS OWNER OR SELLING DEALER
STREET CITY STATE
MOTOR LICENSE AGENT_
STATE OF OKLAHOMA ]
COUNTY OF J
I, the undersigned, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am the owner, or
legal agent of the owner of the above described vehicle and that the statements
contained herein are true.
Owner or Legal Agent of Owner
SIGN IN INK
Subscribed and sworn to before me this_ day of ,19_.
My Commission Expires Notary Public
I the undersigned, hereby certify I have checked the motor and serial num-
bers of the above described vehicle and find they conform to the numbers shown
in this application.
By:
Sign Here Title or Position
(City) (State) (Date)
The above MUST be executed by a sheriff, deputy sheriff, police officer, repre-
sentative of Oklahoma Tax Commission or other law enforcement officers.
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The following extra or optional equipment and accessories were physically
attached to the vehicle described on the front of this form at the time of sale
and were sold as a part thereof. (Fully describe equipment or accessories and
include related parts on items listed below.)
Suggested Retail
Equipment and Accessories Selling Price
FACTORY DELIVERED PRICE OF BASIC VEHICLE ..... $
Air Conditioner ...............












. ...... .. .. ...... .. ... ...
. . . . . .. . . . . . . °. .. .. . . . .
... °. . . . . ........ .. ° °.....
.. •.... • . .. .... .... .. ... .
. . •. . . .. •. . . . . . . .. •. . . ... . . .°
. . . . . . . .•. .. . . . . . . . . . . . ..°
.... .... $
..... ... $






... .. .. .. $
...... ... $




TOTAL DELIVERED PRICE ...................... $
I, (we) the undersigned, under the penalties of perjury, do declare the above
to be a true statement of facts.
Firm Name or Individual
By_
19 -Dealer's Lic. No. _ City.
OUT-OF-STATE TITLE INFORMATION
Issued to Date
Address City_ State _ Zip
Title No. & State
License No. & Year
Remarks:
[Vol. 14:770
• • .... • ° °
° • .... ° • °
° . ° ° ° ° ° ° °
• • • ° ° ° ° ° .
..... • • ° °
.... • • • °
° . ° . . ....
° ° • • o • . ° °
° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° •
° • ° ° ° ° • ° •
° ° ° • ° ° , • °
° ° .... . • °
° ..... ° ° °
o ° • ° ° ° • . •
° ° • • ° ° ° ° •
° ° • • ° ° • • •
° o ° ° ° . ° ° °
• , .... ° • •
° , ° • ° ° ° • •
27
Ruffing: Four Laws in Thirteen Months: Perfecting a Security Interest in O
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978

















Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss4/4
